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ALL OR NOTHING: EXPLAINING THE SIZE OF
SUPREME COURT MAJORITIES
PAUL H. EDELMAN* AND SUZANNA SHERRY"

In this Article, Professors Edelman and Sherry use a probabilistic
model to explore the process of coalitionformation on the United
States Supreme Court. They identify coalition formation as a
Markov process with absorbingstates and examine voting patterns
from twelve Court Terms. On the basis of their data, they
conclude that Justices are reluctantto remain in small minorities.
Surprisingly, however, they also find that a three-Justice minority
coalition is less likely to suffer defections than a four-Justice
minority coalition. This counterintuitive result suggests that while
in general it is minority Justices ratherthan majority Justices who
drive the process of coalition formation, five-Justice majorities
may be particularlyinterested in attractingadditionalvotes. The
Article closes with suggestionsfor future research.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has nine Justices, and it takes
five to make a majority. Based on this information alone, what might
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you suppose are the two most common sizes of a majority coalition?
What about the least common?
Previous research has suggested both that the larger the majority,
the less likely it is to make any effort to attract further votes' and that
the smaller the number of dissenters, the more likely any given
dissenter is to defect to the majority.? These two propositions create
some tension, leaving us unable to predict how likely it is that any
given majority might garner additional votes: for example, whether a
seven-to-two initial vote eventually will become an eight-to-one or
even a unanimous opinion.
Even more intriguing than these tensions in prior research are
the actual data. Examining twelve Supreme Court Terms spread over
four decades, we found that, in ten of the twelve Terms, unanimous
opinions and five-to-four splits were two of the three most common
results. In almost half of the Terms, unanimous decisions and five-tofour decisions were the two most common outcomes. On the other
hand, eight-to-one decisions were among the least common. In other
words, the Court seems to vacillate between maximum unanimity and
maximum division. What explains this pattern?
After a brief discussion in Part I of other scholars' unsuccessful
attempts to explain the pattern of majority coalition sizes, we propose
in Part 11 a new model for understanding the distribution of majority
coalition sizes. Our model views coalition formation as a stochastic
process, with each non-majority Justice continually reacting to the
size of the majority coalition at any given time. In particular, we posit
a model based on a basic Markov process with absorbing states.4
Solving the equations of our model for the twelve Terms leads us
to conclude in Part Il that, with one extremely interesting caveat, the
smaller the number of dissenters, the more likely it is that those
dissenters will be persuaded to join the majority, despite the fact that
1. See Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., Marshaling the Court:
Bargaining and
Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court,42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294,312 (1998).
2. See Saul Brenner et al., Fluidity and Coalition Sizes on the Supreme Court, 36
JURIMETRIcs 245,249-52 (1996); Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, Conformity Voting on
the United States Supreme Court,54 J. POL. 762, 768 (1992); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581,587-89 (1996).
3. Aggregating all twelve Terms shows that unanimous opinions are most common
(27%), followed by five-to-four opinions (24%). Eight-to-one (14%) and seven-to-two
(13%) decisions are the least common. Six-to-three decisions fall in the middle (21%).
Because of rounding, these percentages do not total 100%.
4. Both the Markov process and the mathematical basis for solving it are described
in Appendix A.
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the majority may make no particular effort to attract votes. We call
this pattern the "bandwagon effect," and our model allows us not
only to validate it but to measure it. Thus, our findings support and
elaborate on prior research suggesting that a Justice who is a lone
dissenter is the most likely to change his vote.
This conclusion is important not only for its quantification of
prior assumptions about voting patterns, but also because it suggests
quite strongly that future research should go in particular directions.
Our findings demonstrate that, in exploring Supreme Court voting
behavior, researchers should focus on dissenters rather than on the
majority. Moreover, because the mathematical probabilities by
themselves sufficiently explain the actual distributions of coalition
sizes, our data imply that focusing on either individual Justices or on
case-specific outcome preferences is largely irrelevant, except to
explain minor fluctuations from Court to Court or Term to Term.
Our second conclusion is perhaps even more startling: the most
stable size for a majority opinion is six Justices. In other words, the
least likely Justice to join a majority coalition is one who is in a threeJustice minority (not a four-Justice minority, as one might expect
from the other results). Neither cooperative game theory nor the
bandwagon effect would predict this result. We discuss the
implications of this finding at the end of Part III.
I. PREVIOUS EXPLANATIONS
Previous explanations of voting patterns are insufficient
primarily because they explain only part of the data and conflict with
other data. Many theories are offered, for example, to explain the
prevalence of unanimous opinions, but all of them would also predict
a low occurrence of five-to-four opinions and a relatively high
occurrence of eight-to-one opinions. Although standard game theory
analysis can explain the prevalence of five-to-four opinions, it is
completely unable to explain the high occurrence of unanimous
outcomes. Indeed, it is the "all-or-nothing" quality of the results that
is most difficult to explain. Any successful model must explain
consistently all of the data-including not only the prevalence of both
maximally united and maximally divided Courts, but also the dearth
of eight-to-one decisions.
One possible explanation for the existence of so many
unanimous cases is that many of the cases before the Court are simply
easy calls. But if it is ease of decision that produces unanimous
opinions, then why are there so few eight-to-one cases, which are
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presumably just a little bit less easy? And why do the cases seem to
be either very easy (yielding unanimous decisions) or very hard
(yielding five-to-four decisions), with fewer cases in between?
Moreover, it seems implausible that very many "easy" cases actually
reach the Supreme Court.'
A second popular explanation for the prevalence of unanimous
opinions is similarly flawed. Several scholars have argued that there
is considerable institutional pressure to achieve unanimity, especially
in important cases.6 Unanimous decisions are seen as more
compelling and less susceptible to either outright defiance or
overturning by Congress or a subsequent Court. The classic
examples, of course, are Brown v. Board of Education7 and Cooper v.
Aaron.8 Both cases were not only unanimous, but signed by all nine
Justices, and, in Cooper, Justice Frankfurter was persuaded not to
release his concurring opinion until a week after the decision came
down. 9
While institutional pressure may explain some individual cases, it
does not explain very many of the roughly one-third of all cases that
are decided unanimously. The vast majority of these cases are not of
such social or political import that the public or the legislature will
care whether the outcome is unanimous or not. As an exercise in this
regard, think back to the 1997-1998 Term and attempt to recall even
one of the thirty-nine unanimous decisions of that Term. 10
5. For another critique of this explanation, see Saul Brenner & Theodore S.
Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U.S. Supreme Court: Case Stimuli and
JudicialAttitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75, 83-84 (1987). A variant on this explanation is a
recent model suggesting that more complex cases generate more opinions. See Scott P.
Johnson, The Influence of Case Complexity on the Opinion Writing of the Rehnquist Court,
25 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 45, 58 (1999). Not only does this variant still leave the overall
pattern of coalition-size distributions unexplained, but it also considers the cases as falling
into only two categories, simple and complex. There is no examination, for example, of
the relationship between the relative complexity and the number of separate opinions.
6. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 107
(1997); David W. Rohde, Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitionsin the Supreme Court, 16
MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 208, 215-16 (1972); Jeffrey R. Lax, Unanimity and Dissent in the
Supreme Court: The Conflict of Consensus 1, 2 (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
9. Cooper was issued on September 29, 1958, and Justice Frankfurter did not file his
concurring opinion until October 6. See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 20 n.* (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). On the negotiations leading up to this delay, see Dennis J. Hutchinson,
Unanimity andDesegregation: Decisionmakingin the Supreme Court,1948-1958, 68 GEO.
L.J. 1, 82-83 (1979).

10. The unanimous decisions included three cases interpreting provisions of the
federal bankruptcy act, two interpretations of the statutes governing removal jurisdiction,
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Moreover, the "institutional pressure" hypothesis is flatly
inconsistent with the prevalence of five-to-four decisions. Again, as

with the "easy case" explanation, the problem lies in explaining why
the data do not fall into a smooth decreasing curve but rather into

two spikes at opposite ends. If we adhere to the "institutional
pressure" theory, then the actual data suggest that cases are either
very important or not important at all, with few in between.
A third explanation for the frequency of unanimous opinions is a
variant on the second:

the greater the potential threat that any

particular case poses to the Court itself, the larger the majority
coalition is likely to be.

This theory has been critiqued elsewhere 2

and is suspect because it focuses only on civil liberties cases and only
on the Warren Court. Both that Court and that type of case may not

be representative. In any case, this theory, like the others, does not
explain the actual pattern of distribution unless one concludes that
cases most commonly present either a great potential threat

(unanimous decisions) or very little potential threat (five-to-four
decisions), but rarely anything in between.
Turning to the other side of the data, the large number of five-tofour decisions can be explained using cooperative game theory, which
suggests that the most typical coalitions are minimally winning onesin this context, a five-to-four decision. 3 But again, this does not
an ERISA case, a case establishing the statute of limitations for the federal Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendment Act, and a case involving the Death on the High Seas Act (to
name some of the cases in which social importance or institutional pressure was unlikely to
play a role). See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998)
(removal); Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116 (1998) (Death on the High Seas
Act); Geissal v. Moore Med. Co., 524 U.S. 74 (1998) (ERISA); Cohen v. De La Cruz, 523
U.S. 213 (1998) (Bankruptcy Act); Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (Bankruptcy
Act); Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (1998) (removal); Fidelity Fin. Serv. v.
Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998) (Bankruptcy Act); Bay Area Laundry v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,
522 U.S. 192 (1997) (MPPAA).
Among the cases decided by a divided Court, and therefore of less social or
political importance according to the "institutional pressure" theory, were Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the line item veto), County of Sacramento
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (immunizing the police from liability for a death caused by a
high speed chase), Burlington Industriesv. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (imposing vicarious
liability on employers for sexual harassment of employees by other employees), and
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (same).

11. See Rohde, supra note 6, at 216.
12. See Michael W. Giles, Equivalent Versus Minimum Winning Opinion Coalition
Size: A Test of Two Hypotheses, 21 AM. J. POL. Sci. 405 (1977); R.W. Hoyer et al., Some
Problems in Validation of Mathematical and Stochastic Models of Political Phenomena:
The Case of the Supreme Court,21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 381 (1977).
13. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RIKER & PETER C. ORDESHOOK, AN INTRODUCTION TO
PosrrvE POLITICAL THEORY 177 (1973).
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explain why there are so many unanimous decisions.
Finally, one might try to explain the data by looking at the value
preferences of the Justices themselves. One might argue that there
are many unanimous decisions because the Justices' values are
clumped, so they tend to agree and reach consensus. Of course, one
could make the converse argument as well: the pattern of alternating
Republican and Democratic nominations means that Justices tend not
to agree, resulting in many five-to-four decisions. Similarly, if we
focused on what might be called "partner preferences" among
Justices, we might conclude that certain Justices were more or less
willing to join existing coalitions containing certain of their brethren."
These substantive, value-based explanations suffer from several
related problems. First, of course, every possible explanation may be
contradicted by another possible explanation, and the conflict can be
resolved only by looking at the data. Moreover, our data show that
none of the value-based models are very plausible because valuebased models can explain neither the consistency over four decades
nor the prevalence of both unanimous and five-to-four opinions.
Thus, our analysis suggests that research into individual preferences is
not likely to yield useful results except at the margins.
II. THE MODEL
A.

Different Types of Models

We begin by explaining what we mean by a model and what we
hope to accomplish with it. Ours is not the typical social science
model that hopes to describe the phenomenon in question. Rather,
we present a model that is functionally equivalent to the phenomenon.
By this we mean that the model will behave like the phenomenon-in
this case, Supreme Court voting behavior-with respect to inputs and
outputs, but without necessarily mimicking the actual phenomenon.
For example, a model of the physics behind the moves of an expert
14. A spatial voting model of this sort is proposed in Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon,

The Formation of Opinion Coalitions on the U.S. Supreme Court (1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). It is not clear how to use such a model to analyze the
size of coalitions. Indeed, one of the few predictions that Epstein and Mershon make
based on their model is that "[w]e see no reason for minimal winning coalitions to be
especially frequent"-a prediction that is undermined by our data. Id. at 14.
Epstein and Mershon do not examine the question of coalition size very deeply
and do not consider it a very interesting question: "In our view ... the most important
characteristic of coalitions to predict is not size but instead policy." Id. Our evidence
would seem to indicate that the size of coalitions is more stable and more important than
they believe.
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billiards player does not purport to describe how the player actually
analyzes the situation, but it does reproduce and predict the choices
that the player makes. In other words, while the player does not
typically calculate exact angles, trajectories, speed, and collision force,
such calculations would yield the same results that the player achieves
through instinct and experience. 5
There is obviously a relationship between a descriptive model
and a functionally equivalent one. A descriptive model must be
functionally equivalent to be an accurate description-in other words,
if a descriptive model does not adequately reflect the observed
results, it fails as a description. A functionally equivalent model, on
the other hand, need not be descriptive as long as it mirrors the
observed results. Nevertheless, a functionally equivalent model is
likely to have some descriptive relation to the actual phenomenon, if
only because it is unlikely (although not impossible) that a model
completely severed from the phenomenon would be functionally
equivalent-at least over the long term. And a functionally
equivalent model is also descriptive in the sense that it might serve as
a sufficient explanation of the phenomenon, directing future research
in particular directions and away from less fruitful explanations.
For example, a model that predicts the results of presidential
elections by looking at the health of the economy is probably a fairly
good functionally equivalent model. Although it is not descriptivevoters do not directly consult the latest government financial figures
when casting their ballots-it bears some relation to how people
evaluate incumbents. Moreover, such a model would suggest that
future research focus on the details of the economy: What roles do
inflation or unemployment play? Is it sufficient simply to look at the
15. This distinction between functionally equivalent and descriptive models is
MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3-46 (1953).
Although Friedman did not use the same terminology, he used the billiards example and
defended what we are calling functionally equivalent models from attacks complaining of
their descriptive flaws:
It is frequently convenient to present such a hypothesis by stating that the
phenomena it is desired to predict behave in the world of observation as if they
occurred in a hypothetical and highly simplified world containing only the forces
that the hypothesis asserts to be important.... Such a theory cannot be tested by
comparing its "assumptions" directly with "reality." Indeed, there is no
meaningful way in which this can be done. Complete "realism" is clearly
unattainable, and the question whether a theory is realistic "enough" can be
settled only by seeing whether it yields predictions that are good enough for the
purpose in hand or that are better than predictions from alternative theories.
Id. at 40-41. For a more contemporary discussion of these two different views of modeling
in the context of rational choice theory, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO,
PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE 30 (1994).

explored in
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stock market? Are there ways in which people's perceptions of the
health of the economy can be influenced, with a consequent effect on
the election? On the other hand, a model that predicts the results of
presidential elections by means of astrology might be successful as a
functional equivalent for a few elections, but it is not likely to work
for very long, precisely
because it bears no relation to the
6
phenomenon itself.'

Despite some relationship between a descriptive model and a
functionally equivalent one, however, they are not identical, and thus
should be judged by different criteria. A descriptive model should
give an accurate and thorough account of the phenomenon, including
all of the major factors affecting the phenomenon. By this standard,
our model is quite poor. The standard is irrelevant, however, because
our model is not intended to be descriptive.
A functionally equivalent model, by contrast, need not provide
any substantive description. The value of the model is in the
numbers. For a functionally equivalent model to be valid, the
numbers must be consistent with those produced by the phenomenon
in the real world and must fit with all other available data. For a
functionally equivalent model to be useful and interesting, however, it
must do more: it should reveal relationships that were not previously
apparent and that point to nonobvious, empirically testable
relationships in the phenomenon itself. By this standard, our model is
quite successful.
Our model posits that the size of a final coalition is governed by
a probabilistic process in which the transition probability-that is, the
likelihood that at least one Justice will join the existing coalition-is
dependent only on the size of the coalition. Based on this
assumption, we construct a Markov process with absorbing states,
with which we model the coalition formation of the Court.
Calculating the transition probabilities shows that in general they
increase with the size of the majority coalition.17 This increase
suggests that, consistent with some of the prior research," Justices are
increasingly less likely to remain in smaller minorities.
The idea behind our Markov model is that each Justice not in a
currently existing majority must decide whether to join that majority.
16. A valid descriptive model for presidential elections would be extremely complex,
taking into account the myriad factors that voters actually consider in casting their ballots.
No one has so far been able to produce such a model, although presidential candidates
continually seek one.
17. See infraPart III.
18. See Dorff & Brenner, supra note 2, at 768.
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We assume that each Justice makes her decision independently and
that the decision does not depend on which particular Justices are in
or outside of the majority. As we will see, the data generally support
these assumptions, although some minor variations may be due to the
personalities of individual Justices and their interactions with one
another. Indeed, our data suggest that it might be useful and
interesting to examine individual Justices and their interactions in
order to explain the minor fluctuations between Terms.
Nevertheless, the numbers would not work out the way they do if
Justices were influenced in an important way by the presence or
absence of other Justices in the coalition.
The assumption that the formation of a coalition is a process
rather than an event-and that it is influenced by knowledge of the
size of the coalition existing at any given time-is supported by how
the Supreme Court operates in practice. The Justices certainly have
numerous opportunities to assess the size of the majority coalition
and to tailor their own votes accordingly. In addition to informal
discussions among chambers, all of the Justices present their views on
a case at the conference before a final vote is taken;19 moreover,
Justices not infrequently change their votes even after the
conference30
Note that we do not suggest that the individual Justices actually
perform any mathematical calculations or even consciously rely on
discomfort with being in a small minority. We contend only that this
model explains the data better than any other model and, as we
discuss in Part Ill, that the model reveals a surprising result that is not
apparent from using other models.
At this point, however, a reader might ask why our model is
important if it does not rely on what the Justices actually think about;
another way to put it is to ask why a functionally equivalent model is
useful if it is not also descriptive. Such a model is useful because it
rules out certain descriptive explanations and makes others more
plausible. For example, we know from our data that (except possibly
in the case of a transition from a five-Justice to a six-Justice majority)
the dissenters, not the majority, drive the increase in size. We also
know that any explanation that relies primarily on individual
personalities and preferences is unnecessarily complicated, although
such individual differences might serve to add interesting insights to
our model.
19. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 65-79.
20. Cf id. at 9 (providing an example of judicial voting in a particular case).
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B.

The Detailsof the Model
The model works in the following way. Suppose we currently
have a majority coalition of size k, where 5 < k < 8.21 Assume that
each of the 9 - k Justices not in the coalition will join the big coalition
with a probability Pk, a probability that is dependent only on the size
of the current majority coalition. We call this probability the joining
probability. The non-coalition (or minority) Justices will make their
determinations simultaneously and independently. If none of the
Justices join the coalition, the process is terminated with a majority
coalition of size k. If all of the Justices join the coalition, the process
is terminated with a unanimous decision. If some but not all of the
Justices choose to join the coalition, the process starts again with a
new majority coalition of the new size.
As an example, suppose that we begin with 6 Justices currently in
the majority and that p6 = 1/3. This means that for each of the 3
Justices not in the majority, the probability that he will join the
majority is 1/3. The probability that none of them will join, thus
yielding a final coalition of 6, is (1 - 1/3)' = 8/27. The probability that
all of them will join, thus yielding a unanimous opinion, is
(1/3)3 = 1/27. Finally, the probability that the coalition will have
grown, but not to unanimity, meaning that the process will begin
again with a new coalition size, is 1 - 8/27 - 1/27 = 2/3.
If we have all of the joining probabilities for any given Term, we
can calculate the exact distribution of coalition sizes. We assume that
all coalitions start at five. From p, we can calculate the percentage of
five-Justice coalitions that will, in the first round of the "game," stay
as five-Justice coalitions22 or become six-Justice coalitions,23 sevenJustice coalitions, 4 eight-Justice coalitions,'
or nine-Justice
coalitions. 26 Then we take the six-Justice coalitions and use p6 to
calculate what percentage will turn into seven-, eight-, and nineJustice coalitions in the second round and repeat the process for p,
and p,. At this point, we simply tally up our accumulated percentages
from each round for each coalition size. Figure 1 depicts the process
in graphic form.

21. If k = 9, we have a unanimous decision, and the process is terminated. If k < 5, we
did not start with a majority.

22. (1-p,) 4.

23. 4xp 5 x(1-ps)3.
24. 6 xp2x (1 p5)2.
25. 4xp3x (l-pS).
26. p.
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FIGURE 1

THE COALITION FORMING PROCESS
Initial

Final 5

Final 6

Final 7

Final 8

Final 9

(Intermediate means that, although the coalition size has been
reached, the game is not over.)
Notice that any given set of joining probabilities will yield only
one distribution pattern. Note also that neither the joining
probabilities nor their relationships to each other are obvious from
the distributions; they must be calculated. Thus, the joining
probabilities can reveal more information about the Justices'
interactions than does a simple table of coalition-size distributions.
The joining probabilities also quantify and specify with better
exactitude the tendencies that have been noted by the scholars who
have investigated the paper record and have concluded that votechanges become more likely as the size of the minority decreases. 7
It turns out that this particular Markov process can also be
solved in reverse? 8 That is, from a given distribution, a unique set of
joining probabilities can be calculated. In Part III, we calculate the
joining probabilities for twelve Supreme Court Terms. Although it is
theoretically possible that constructing the joining probabilities in this
27. See Dorff & Brenner, supra note 2, at 768.
28. The details of the computation are given in Appendix A. Not all Markov
processes can be solved in reverse; indeed, most of them cannot. In a general Markov
process, the number of different transition probabilities exceeds the number of absorbing
states, so it is mathematically impossible to solve for the probabilities in terms of the final
distribution of outcomes.
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way might yield "joining probabilities" that are negative (which
would indicate a serious flaw in the model), the actual data never
produced such probabilities. This result confirms that the data are
consistent with the model. If the data had produced negative "joining
probabilities"--as in theory they might have-then we would have
had to abandon the model.
C. Methodology
Before we turn to the results of our computation, we must
discuss several methodological issues. In applying the model, we
assume that the process starts with a coalition size of five. Why not
with a larger or smaller coalition? First, starting with a minimal
winning coalition is in the spirit of other cooperative game theory
analyses. For instance, the Shapley-Shubik model for measuring
voting strength assumes that the votes are cast sequentially, and the
voter who casts the winning vote is seen as the pivotal voter.2 9 While
perhaps not realistic, Shapley and Shubik's assumption of sequential
votes represents a conventionally accepted way to analyze the
strength of various voters." In the same way, we assume that
coalitions are formed sequentially, starting from the minimal winning
coalition of five votes. Note also that our model has nothing to say on
the question of how this original majority coalition comes into being.
There is a second, more practical, reason to begin with a
coalition of five rather than a larger or smaller coalition. How would
one identify the "original" coalition size in any given case? If we
chose the size of the majority coalition in the conference vote, that
would ignore all information a Justice acquired before voting at
conference-including not only informal conversations prior to the
conference, but the conference discussion itself. It is not implausible
that a Justice waiting her turn to vote might see a majority coalition in
the process of forming and take that information into account. Thus,
the conference vote might itself depend on joining probabilities.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of beginning with a fiveJustice coalition is that some interesting cases involve larger initial
majorities that suffer defections; indeed, one will occasionally read a
majority opinion that obviously began life as a dissent, or vice versa.
29. See L.S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of
Power in a Committee System, 48 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 787, 788 (1954); see also Paul H.
Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63, 74-75 (1996) (noting that not all fifth votes are
pivotal because some threats to dissent are not credible).
30. See, e.g., ALAN D. TAYLOR, MATHEMAnCS AND POLITIcs 65-71 (1995).
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Our model says nothing about the probability that a Justice might
leave a majority coalition. It would not be difficult to calculate the
probability that, say, a seven-Justice coalition will become a sixJustice coalition, but doing so seems counterintuitive because it would
require starting with an assumption that decisions begin as unanimous
and then deteriorate into smaller majorities. Thus, the decision not to
focus on defections was partly due to the implausibility of this
assumption, but also to the fact that defections from majority
coalitions are likely to be less frequent than decisions to join them.
For one thing, a credible threat to desert 31 might influence a majority
opinion author to make changes. Moreover, our data show an
increasing unwillingness to be in a small minority, suggesting that the
most likely defection is from a five-Justice majority-which simply
changes our starting point from one five-Justice majority to a
different one.
A second methodological question asks how we measure the size
of the majority coalition. Do we look at the size of the coalition
producing the decision or the size of the coalition joining the majority
opinion? We believe that the size of the opinion coalition is more
meaningful because Justices who concur only in the result can
disagree substantially with the majority. Thus, focusing on the
number of Justices concurring only in the result can mask tremendous
differences in reasoning and conclusions. 32
As an example, consider the case of 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode
Island.33 Although there were no dissenters from the judgment of the
Court invalidating Rhode Island's restrictions on liquor advertising,
there was no majority opinion, and the Justices disagreed about both
the breadth and the vitality of the relevant precedent.?, To consider
the case as a unanimous decision would grossly misrepresent the
result. More to the point for our analysis, no Justice was ever
presented with a majority opinion as a fait accompli, and thus our
"game" would never have started. Just to confirm the validity of our
results, however, we recalculated the 1995 and 1996 Terms, measuring
the size of the majority by the size of the decision. As expected, the
joining probabilities went up, but not by very much, and the overall
31. By credible, we mean that it would be plausible for the Justice in question to join
the minority coalition. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 29, at 83.

32. See id. at 79.
33. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
34. See id. at 488-516; id. at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 518-28 (Thomas, J., concurring in Parts I, II, VI, and VII, and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 528-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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pattern remained the same. 35

A third methodological issue concerns the selection of the twelve
particular Supreme Court Terms. In each decade from the 1960s to
the 1990s, we selected three consecutive Terms of the same Courtthat is, three consecutive Terms without a change in personnel.3 6 A
range of three Terms gave us a deeper picture of each Court, and
including in our study four decades of decisions ensured that the
results did not depend on the idiosyncrasies of any particular
collection of Justices. When there were more than three consecutive
Terms of the same Court, we chose the last three in order to reflect a
more mature Court with more settled interactions. We therefore
39
3
included the following Terms: 1962-1964, 37 1972-1974, 1 1983-1985,
and 1995-19971
The last methodological point is to describe in detail how we
tallied the cases.4' For the reasons suggested above, cases without a
35. We give the joining probabilities from Table 1, followed in parentheses by the
joining probabilities that would result if we used the size of the majority decision rather
than the majority opinion:
1995: p5 = .37 (.39),p 6 = .30 (.36), p7 = .44 (.40), p 8 = .75 (.75)
1996: p 5 = .32 (.33), p 6 = .27 (.31), p, = .43 (.55), p8 = .67 (.77)
We chose these two Terms for convenience. In beginning our research, we had started
with these two Terms and had initially included enough information in the database to
make recalculation easy. For the other Terms, we would have had to go back and recount
the cases.
36. We were not able to collect data from the 1950s because there were not three
consecutive years of a stable Court during that decade.
37. During this period, the Court consisted of Chief Justice Earl Warren and
Associate Justices Hugo L. Black, William 0. Douglas, Tom C. Clark, John M. Harlan,
William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron R. White, and Arthur J. Goldberg. See 371
U.S. III; see also GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
at B-5 to B-6 (13th ed. 1997) (chart).
38. During this period, the Court consisted of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and
Associate Justices William 0. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stewart, Byron R.
White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H.
Rehnquist. See 409 U.S. III; see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supranote 37, at B-5 to B-6
(chart).
39. During this period, the Court consisted of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and
Associate Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Byron R. White, Thurgood Marshall, Harry A.
Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., William H. Rehnquist, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra
Day O'Connor. See 464 U.S. III; see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 37, at B-6 to
B-7 (chart).

40. During this period, the Court consisted of Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist,
and Associate Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia,
Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and
Stephen Breyer. See 516 U.S. III; see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 37, at B-6
to B-7 (chart).
41. All counts were done by hand by the authors. We looked at the listing of Justices
provided at the beginning of each opinion in U.S. Law Week (for the 1995-1997 Terms) or
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majority opinion were excluded from the data. Because we were

trying to determine whether the size of the majority or the size of the
minority was more significant, any case in which fewer than nine
Justices participated was also excluded. We could not know, for
example, whether a seven-to-one decision was mathematically
equivalent to a seven-to-two decision or to an eight-to-one decision.42
We also excluded all cases in which the majority opinion was per
curiam.43 Certainly, many per curiam decisions should be excluded:
it would not have been appropriate, for example, to include per
curiam decisions dismissing a writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. Other per curiam decisions probably should have been
included in the count, as they addressed substantive issues.
Nevertheless, the judgment about whether a per curiam case was
important enough to count could not be made consistently-and
in
44
difference.
much
make
not
did
them
excluding
any case,
the United States Supreme Court Reports: Lawyer's Edition (2d) (for the earlier Terms).
Any Justice listed as joining the majority opinion was counted as part of the coalition,
regardless of whether he or she also wrote a concurrence. Any ambiguities were resolved
by looking at the individual opinions. All legal judgment calls were made by Professor
Sherry, who is solely responsible for them.
42. Excluding cases decided by smaller Courts may explain the peculiar results from
the 1964 Term, which had an exceptionally high number of missing Justices.
43. We made one exception to this rule. In Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986),
the per curiam opinion simply announced the two parts of the judgment and noted that
the first part was reached for the reasons given in Justice Brennan's unanimous concurring
opinion and the second for the reasons given in Justice White's five-Justice concurring
opinion. We made a judgment call, concluding that the per curiam format was used for
convenience only, and counted it as two separate majorities of sizes nine and five,
respectively.
44. Although for the later years of our study we might have relied on the judgments
made in the annual Supreme Court issue of the HarvardLaw Review, that source was not
adequate for the earlier Terms. To confirm the validity of our results, however, we
recalculated the 1995 and 1996 Terms including the per curiam cases identified as
substantial by the Harvard survey and found that the results were virtually identical.
Thus, for those two years, we can compare the results in Tables 1 and 2, which exclude all
per curiam decisions, with the results we initially obtained, which include those per curiam
decisions counted by the Harvard survey. There is virtually no change. Here are the
numbers for the 1995 and 1996 Terms (the figures in parentheses are those obtained by
using the Harvard count):
1995: p5 = .37 (.36),p 6 = 30 (.30),p, = .44 (.41),p = .75 (.76)
1996:p 5 = .32 (.33),p 6 = .27 (.25),p, = .43 (.43),p = .67 (.71)
The Harvard survey added 4 per curiam cases for the 1995 Term, see Leading Cases, 110
HARV. L. REV. 135,367 n.a (1996), and 6 per curiam cases for the 1996 Term, see Leading
Cases, 111 HARV. L. REv. 197, 431 n.a (1997). We chose these two Terms for
convenience. In beginning the research, we had started with these two Terms and had
initially relied on the Harvard survey until we discovered that it was not adequate for the
earlier years. Thus our initial data for the two Terms did include per curiam decisions, so
when we recalculated without the per curiam opinions (for the data that appear in Tables
1 and 2), we had a ready comparison.
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Finally, some cases produced multiple majorities of different
sizes, with various Justices joining some parts of the majority opinion
but not others. For most of these cases, we tallied the case as
representing a single instance of each size that occurred. In Koon v.
United States,45 for example, the question was whether the court of
appeals correctly overturned a district judge's downward departure
from the United States Sentencing Guidelines.46 The Supreme Court
decided unanimously that the court of appeals applied an incorrect
standard of review. 47 In applying the correct standard, however, the
Court itself fractured: of the four factors cited by the district court to
support the downward departure, the Court rejected one of the
factors unanimously,48 rejected a second factor by a vote of eight to
one,49 and accepted two factors by a vote of six to three.50 We thus
counted Koon three times: once as a unanimous opinion, once as an
eight-Justice majority, and once as a six-Justice majority. We only
counted cases as representing multiple majorities, however, if the
portion of the opinion that a Justice refused to join was legally
significant.5 For example, in Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank &
Trust Co.,s2 Justice Scalia joined almost all of the majority's opinion
interpreting the Expedited Funds Availability Act,53 but refused to

join the portion of the opinion that looked at legislative history to
confirm the majority's interpretation.54 We did not count that dispute
as yielding a separate coalition size.

45. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
46. See id. at 85.
47. See idt at 91.
48. See id. at 111.
49. See id. at 109-11; id. at 114 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
50. See id. at 111-12; id. at 114-18 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); it. at 118-19 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
51. Again, there was one unusual exception. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), Justice Brennan joined the majority's opinion but not its judgment. See id. at
701 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He agreed with the majority's
substantive analysis and conclusion (that a criminal defendant had received
constitutionally adequate counsel), but dissented from the judgment on the ground-not
raised by the parties or considered by any other Justice-that the death penalty violated
the Eighth Amendment. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Although technically a legally significant difference (after all, he, unlike the majority
whose opinion he joined, would have reversed the court below), the dispute was not really
part of the case, and so we included him in the majority.
52. 516 U.S. 264 (1996).
53. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4010 (1994).
54. See Bank One Chicago, 516 U.S. at 279-80 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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III. THE RESULTS

A. JoiningProbabilities
Although the distribution of majority coalition sizes varied from
year to year, as did the particular joining probabilities, there was one
constant. With the exception of slight variations in the 1964 and 1973
Terms, p, > p, > p5 > p6 . In other words, the probability that a
minority Justice would join an eight-Justice majority was the largest,
followed by the probability of joining a seven-Justice majority,
followed by the probability of joining a five-Justice majority.
Surprisingly, in each of the twelve Terms the most stable coalition
size is not five but six. By the most stable, we mean that minority
Justices are least likely to join a six-Justice coalition.
The joining probabilities for each Term are given in Table 1, and
the aggregate joining probabilities for each of the four Courts over
three Terms are given in Table 2.5
TABLE 1

JOINING PROBABILITIES BY TERM

Term

Ps

PI

P7

1962

.34

.20

.40

.42

1963

.32

.23

.45

.56

1964

.39

.17

.27

.33

1972

.27

.16

.38

.45

1973
1974

.26
.29

.15
.13

.54
.45

.40
.55

1983

.30

.21

.55

.59

1984
1985

.30
.23

.19
.20

.35
.45

.67
.55

1995

.37

.30

.44

.75

1996
1997

.32
.33

.27
.19

.43
.56

.67
.76

Ps

55. We provide the raw data from which these tables were constructed-that is, the
distributions of coalition sizes-in Appendix B.
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TABLE 2

56
JOINING PROBABILITIES BY COURT

Court

PS

P6

P9

1962-1964

.34

.20

.37

.45

1972-1974

.27

.15

.45

.47

1983-1985

.27

.20

.46

.60

1995-1997

.34

.25

.48

.73

What is especially interesting is that the pattern of joining
probabilities remains consistent from Court to Court. Indeed, as
Table 2 shows, if we aggregate the joining probabilities for each
Court, the probabilities themselves are remarkably similar from
decade to decade and from Court to Court. This is true despite the
large differences in the actual distributions. For example, the
percentage of unanimous opinions ranges from a low of 18 (in 1964
and 1972) to a high of 46 (in 1995); the percentage of five-to-four
opinions ranges from 14 (in 1964) to 36 (in 1985). 57
B.

Comments

Given the persistence of the pattern, we can comfortably use it to
draw some conclusions. First, the relatively high values of p8 and P7
help explain some previous research results and reject some theories.
Both theoretical analysis of the marginal utility of each additional
vote and empirical research on the Justices' behavior suggest that the
willingness of a majority to compromise for additional votes should
decline with the increasing size of the majority. 58 Even if, as some
scholars have argued, majorities have an incentive to bargain because
supermajorities have enhanced influence, that incentive should
decline with the increasing size of the majority. 9 Thus, if the desires
56. These aggregated probabilities were calculated by counting the total numbers of
each coalition size during the entire three-year period and applying the model to the
aggregated data. Thus, the aggregated probability is not simply an average of the
probabilities of individual years.
57. The distributions and percentages are given in Appendix B.
58. See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 65 (1964);
Wahlbeck et al., supranote 1, at 312.
59. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 556 (1999)
(making this argument and conceding that the power to command changes in the majority
opinion declines with each additional vote).
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of the existing majority were the significant factor in attracting more
Justices to the coalition, we would expect the joining probabilities to
decline as the size of the majority increases.
Our data, however, show exactly the opposite. The high values
of p, and p7 suggest that, even if the majority is unwilling to
compromise, the last few remaining Justices not in the coalition are
very interested in joining. And being in a minority of one is even less
desirable than being in a minority of two. Our data thus demonstrate
what we caU a "bandwagon effect." The bandwagon effect is
consistent with earlier work showing that lone dissenters are more
likely than any other Justices to switch their votes. 60 Our analysis
therefore indicates that the focus on the growth of coalitions
generally should be on the size of the minority and its relative
desirability, rather than on the size of the majority and the power that
it wields or on the value to the Court of supermajorities.
Note that while our data document and measure the bandwagon
effect, the data do not explain its causes. Scholars have suggested
several possibilities. One is that, lacking much power to influence the
development of doctrine, minority Justices are unwilling to expend
the time and effort necessary to write a separate opinion.6' Another
is that at least some Justices "like to win (or to be perceived as
'winners'),"6' and a third is simple collegiality. 3 Whatever the reason,
our data confirm that Justices in small minorities are drawn toward
joining the majority opinion.
The model thus suggests that the distribution of majority opinion
coalition sizes can be explained solely as a consequence of the fact
that the joining probabilities increase with the size of the majority.
That is, earlier empirical research indicating an increasing willingness
to join large majoritiess is by itself sufficient to explain the actual
distribution of opinion sizes. Future empirical research now might be
directed toward the motivations of the dissenting Justices and the
60. See, e.g., Brenner et al., supra note 2, at 249-52; Dorff & Brenner, supra note 2, at
773; Maltzman & Wahlbeck, supra note 2, at 587-89. Our data do conflict with one
finding of Brenner et al.: they concluded that Justices in a four-Justice minority were least
likely to switch votes, and our data show that a three-Justiceminority is in fact the most
stable. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69. Further research is warranted here.
61. See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
UnfortunateInterdisciplinaryIgnorance,92 Nw. U. L. REV. 251, 305-06 (1997).
62. Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635,1661 (1998).

63. See Lewis A. Komhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in CollegialCourts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1993).

64. See supra note 2 (citing sources).
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causes of the bandwagon effect. It might also focus on whether
particular Justices are more or less susceptible to the bandwagon
effect.
The bandwagon effect has increased noticeably over the years, at
least with regard to lone dissenters. Between the 1960s Court and the
1990s Court, p8 increased by more than fifty percent (from .45 to .73),
while the other joining probabilities remained constant or increased
only slightly. This finding may be due to the personalities or work
habits of individual Justices or to a strengthening institutional norm
of collegiality. 65 Another possibility is the change in institutional
norms regarding individual expression and the resulting workload.
As Justices have
come to rely more heavily on such devices as the
"cert. pool," 66 their comfort level with collaborative efforts may have
increased. Finally, the increase in p8 might be due to a change in
opinion writing patterns. It used to be relatively common for Justices
to dissent or to concur only in the judgment without writing a separate
opinion. Now Justices rarely do so, obviously increasing the
workload of those who decline to join the majority opinion. Further
research might be warranted to examine the relationship between the
value of p, and the number of dissents and concurrences in judgment
without opinion.
A second, and perhaps more interesting, aspect of the data is the
relationship between p, and p5 . Both the bandwagon effect we
document here and standard game theory predictions of minimal
winning coalitions suggest that p5 should be lower than p,, but the
data consistently show the opposite. Indeed, a non-majority Justice is
only about two-thirds as likely to join a six-Justice coalition as to join
a five-Justice coalition-a substantial difference in an unexpected
direction. What might account for this anomaly?
One possibility is that, while the size of the minority is the
significant factor in most instances, a five-to-four majority has
particular incentives to bargain in order to attract at least one
additional vote. Perhaps this slenderest of majorities perceives itself
as particularly vulnerable to overruling by Congress in statutory cases
65. For more on institutional norms on the Supreme Court, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT,
supranote 6, at 118.
66. The cert. pool involves letting a group of law clerks screen petitions for certiorari
and circulate memoranda to the chambers of all the Justices who are members of the pool.
Begun during the Burger Court era by five Justices, the cert. pool now includes all the
Justices except Justice Stevens. See David M. O'Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the
Cert. Pool, and the Supreme Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 790,
799-800 (1997).
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or by subsequent Courts in constitutional cases.67 A five-Justice
majority also might be concerned about the possibility of defections,
which obviously have a more devastating effect on a minimally
winning majority. In any case, it is clear that there is something
unique about a five-Justice coalition that produces a higher than
expected joining probability. Again, further empirical research is
needed, this time utilizing the various Justices' papers." While prior
research has focused, incorrectly, as our data show, on whether
unanimity is more likely in important cases,69 it might now be useful
to determine whether important cases are more likely to be six-tothree decisions than five-to-four decisions.
CONCLUSION

Over the course of four decades, the Supreme Court changes in
many ways. The personalities of the individual Justices and their
interactions with one another are different for each Court. Some
Courts are more collegial, some Justices more iconoclastic. Each
Term presents a different mix of difficult or controversial cases.
Nevertheless, despite these differences, our mathematical model
shows several constants. First, when Justices join a majority coalition,
it is more likely to be because of their own desire to join than because
of any accommodations made by the majority. Second, it appears
that over time, the Justices have increasingly viewed being a lone
dissenter as quite undesirable. Finally, the most interesting result of
applying our model to the data is that, despite minority Justices'
marked preference for being in a larger rather than a smaller
minority, a majority coalition is more likely to attract a sixth Justice
than it is to attract a seventh. This result suggests that a majority of
five is sufficiently willing to negotiate for additional votes to
overcome the minority Justices' disinclination to abandon what would
67. For other suggestions along this line, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). There is also
the somewhat remote possibility that lower courts will be more hostile toward five-to-four
decisions. See, e.g., Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 17
(Fed. Cir. 1984) ("We must be cautious in extending five to four decisions by analogy
.... " (citations omitted)); United States v. Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Ass'n, 99 F.2d
830, 833-34 (5th Cir. 1938) ("We agree that it is not controlling for the further reason, that
that case, decided as it was by a closely divided court, is authority only for its own facts,
and those facts are not present here.").
68. Epstein and Knight have taken this approach and showed that bargaining does
occur. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 56-111. It remains to examine whether a
five-Justice majority is indeed more eager to bargain and, if so, why.
69. See supra note 6 (citing sources).
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otherwise be a comfortably large minority.
Our model thus presents a clearer picture of Supreme Court
coalition formation and answers questions left open by previous
research. It confirms that, with the exception of the transition from a
five-to-four decision to a six-to-three decision, future research should
focus on the inclinations of the minority Justices rather than on the
motivations of the majority Justices. On the other hand, it offers
potential statistical support for those who explore the peculiar
vulnerabilities-and consequent negotiation tactics-of five-Justice
majorities. Our research also suggests fruitful avenues for further
research, including an investigation of individual Justices' relative
disinclinations to remain in small minorities and an examination of
the relationship between opinion writing norms and the willingness to
remain in a small minority.
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APPENDIX A: THE MODEL
In this Appendix, we describe the model and explain the
mathematics involved in its solution. The model is a basic Markov
process with absorbing states. For some background, the reader
might consult William Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory
and Its Applications,ch. 15 (3d ed. 1968).
The states of our model will be denoted by the set
S={5,6,7,8} u {5, 6,7,8,9)
where the states " will be absorbing states. Let p,, P6, PP,P8 be
probabilities where p, is the probability that a Justice will join a
coalition of i other Justices. If we assume that Justices not in the
coalition make decisions to join independently, then the probability
of exactly i of the 9 -] Justices joining a coalition of j Justices is
Bi, )=
P(,

9 ])

'-'5)

9-j-i

One can now define the non-zero transition probabilities. Let
) be the probability of going to state flfrom state cr. Then
P(i,j)
P(i, 7)
P(i,9)
P(7,7)

=
=
=

B(j-i, i)for5<_i:j<8
B(0, i) for 5 < i < 8
B(9 - i,i)for 5 < i < 8

(1)
(2)
(3)

=

1for 5 < i < 9

(4)

and the remaining transition probabilities are 0.
It is now a relatively simple matter to solve for the probability of
starting in state 5 (that is, with a coalition of 5 Justices) and ending,
eventually, in a state i for i = 5, 6, ... , 9 (that is, the final coalition

has size i). Call this probability C,. The results are:
C, = B(0,5)
C, = B(0,6) B(1,5)
C, = B(0,7) [B(2,5) + B(1,5) B(1,6)]

C, = B(0,8) [B(3,5) + B(2,5) B(1,7) + B(1,5) [B(2,6) +
B(1,6)B(1,7)]]
C,= B(4,5) + B(3,5) B(1,8) + B(2,5) [B(2,7) + B(1,7) B(1,8)] +
B(1,5) [B(3,6) + B(2,6) B(1,8) + B(1,6) [B(2,7) + B(1,7) B(1,8)]]
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The reader will observe that the probability C, is a function only
of the probabilities p, where 5 < 1 < i. Thus, C, is solely a function of
p5 , C is solely a function of p 5 and p 6, and so on. Hence, the values of
the C,'s completely determine the probabilities p,, .-. , P8 . Those
equations will not be explicitly written down here.
We should note that not all probabilities Ci are compatible with
this model. For example, if C6 + B(1,5) is larger than one, then
solving for p 6 will result in a negative number, clearly not the
probability of anything. The fact that the data we have collected is
always compatible and that the solutions for the joining probabilities
are legitimate probability values lends credibility to the model.
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APPENDIX B
DISTRIBUTIONS OF COALITION SIZES

YEAR

1962

1963

1964

1962-1964

MAJORITY
COALITION

NUMBER

PERCENT
(ROUNDED)

5

19

19

6

20

20

7

16

16

8

20

20

9

23

23

5

22

22

6

19

19

7
8

14
16

14
16

9

31

30

5

11

14

6

16

20

7

20

25

8

19

24

9

14

18

5

52

19

6

55

20

7

50

18

8

55

20

9

68

24
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MAJORITY
YEAR
1972

1973

1974

1972-1974
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PERCENT

(RO

COALITION

NUMBER

5

39

28

6
7

34
20

25
14

8

20

14

9

25

18

5

39

30

6

34

26

7

10

8

8

20

15

9

28

21

5

26

25

6

29

28

7

12

11

8

13

12

9

25

24

5

104

28

6

97

26

7

42

11

8

53

14

9

78

21
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PERCENT

YEAR

COALTON

NUMBER

(ROUNDED)

1983

5

36

24

6

31

21

7

13

9

8

20

13

9

50

33

5

22

24

6

20

22

7

16

18

8

9

10

9

24

26

5

53

36

6

32

22

7

15

10

8

16

11

9

31

21

5

111

29

6

83

21

7

44

11

8

45

12

9

105

27

1984

1985

1983-1985
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YEAR
1995

1996

1997

1995-1997
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MAJORITY
COALITION

NUMBER

PERCENT
(ROUNDED)

5

11

15

6
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